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Statutory Procedural Deadlines Are Jurisdictional
in Nature for All Civil Cases and Therefore Must
Never Be Equitably Excused: Bowles v. Russell
CIVIL PROCEDURE - SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION - ACCESS
TO COURTS AND RIGHT TO A REMEDY - DUE PROCESS RIGHT OF
ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES - The United States Supreme Court held
that a federal statute imposing a fourteen-day time limit for the
filing of notice of appeal in federal civil court must be construed as
a jurisdictional requirement that is impossible to equitably excuse
for any reason.
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
Petitioner, Keith Bowles, was convicted of murder and lost on
his direct appeal of both the conviction and the sentence.' Bowles
then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed at Re-
spondent, Harry Russell. 2 After finding that Bowles was lawfully
imprisoned, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio entered final judgment on the merits. 3 Thereafter,
Bowles allowed the thirty-day time limit in which to appeal to
lapse. 4 However, Bowles sought a grant of additional time in
which he could file his appeal by utilizing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). 5
1. Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2362 (2007). An Ohio jury sentenced Bowles to
fifteen years to life imprisonment. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
2. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. Harry Russell was the warden of the prison in which
Bowles was incarcerated. Id. A writ of habeas corpus is "employed to bring a person before
a court ... to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). The United States Supreme Court noted "[t]he great
writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defence
of personal freedom." Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1868). This right was first recog-
nized in England in 1679 after a protracted struggle, and the founding fathers of the
United States considered the right to be "among the immemorial rights descended to them
from their ancestors." Id.
3. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
4. Id. "Except as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judg-
ment, order or decree ... of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice
of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or decree." 28
U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000).
5. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. The statute reads:
[I]f the district court finds-
(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order




While the district court granted Bowles' request in an order
filed on February 10, 2004, the text of the order appeared to give
Bowles seventeen days to file his notice of appeal-in direct con-
travention of the statute's explicit fourteen-day allowance for ap-
peals filed under the exercised exception. 6 Bowles filed his notice
of appeal on February 26, 2004-after the time allowed by statute
but before the deadline set by the district court. 7
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
Russell argued that Bowles' untimely filing barred the court from
exercising its subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal.8 When
the court agreed and dismissed the appeal, Bowles petitioned for a
writ of certiorari, which was granted by the United States Su-
preme Court. 9 In a 5-4 decision, the Court found subject-matter
jurisdiction lacking in Bowles' case because (1) statutory time lim-
its are jurisdictional in nature and (2) a court may not make equi-
table exceptions to jurisdictional requirements. 10
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.'1 First, the
majority recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) explicitly granted the
district court discretion to reopen the time for filing an appeal as
long as certain prerequisites were met. 12 Then, the Court recog-
nized that this statute required the filing of an appeal within four-
teen days of the district court's entry of an order reopening the
time period for filing. 13 Citing a long line of precedent, Justice
(2) that no party would be prejudiced,
the district court may . . . reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days
from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal.
28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000).
6. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2362-63.
10. Id. at 2363, 2366.
11. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Alito joined Justice Thomas' opinion. Id. at 2361-62. Justice Souter authored a dissenting
opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 2367 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2363 (majority opinion).
13. Id. The Court also noted that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) "carries §
2107[(c)] into practice." Id. Rule 4(a)(6) currently states:
The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days
after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following
conditions are satisfied:
(A) the court finds that the moving party did not receive notice under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or or-
der sought to be appealed within 21 days after entry;
(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is
entered or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice under
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Thomas found that the statutorily prescribed time for filing an
appeal is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement. 
14
The majority noted that both the Supreme Court and the courts
of appeals routinely dismiss cases filed after the lapse of a Con-
gressionally mandated time period. 15 Justice Thomas observed
that the Court recently attempted to clarify the difference between
waivable, court-imposed claims-processing rules and non-waivable
jurisdictional rules. 16 Critically, however, Justice Thomas wrote
that none of the Court's recent cases questioned the core require-
ment that a statutorily imposed deadline must be met to allow an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, and he emphasized that cases
involving the Court's procedural rules allowed flexibility as long
as those rules were not an embodiment of an underlying statute. 17
The majority reasoned that the continued use of statutory time
limits as jurisdictional requirements was proper because Congress
has the authority to grant and restrict a federal court's subject-
matter jurisdiction.' 8 Congress created a requirement for the ex-
ercise of the appellate jurisdiction that it granted by specifically
writing a time limit into the statute that authorized the appeal. 19
Congress necessarily restricted jurisdiction in cases that failed to
meet the filing requirement.
20
Having established the jurisdictional nature of a failure to file
an appeal on time, the majority opinion then addressed two cases
that recognized a "unique circumstances" exception, which could
excuse such untimely filings. 21 Expressly overruling Harris Truck
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier;
and
(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6).
14. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2363-64.
15. Id. at 2364.
16. Id. Justice Thomas, writing on behalf of the Court, noted, "several of our recent
decisions have undertaken to clarify the distinction between claims-processing rules and
jurisdictional rules." Id.
17. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Thomas wrote, "none of [our recent decisions] calls
into question our longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for taking an appeal as
jurisdictional .... Critical to our analysis [in cases where the Court equitably excused a
deadline noted in the federal rules] was the fact that '[n]o statute ... specifies a time
limit."' Id. (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 448 (2004)).
18. Id. at 2365. The Constitution grants Congress the "Power... To constitute Tribu-
nals inferior to the supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Congress necessarily has
the power to define the lower federal courts' jurisdiction within the limits of the Constitu-
tion because it has the constitutional authority to create those courts. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 337-38 (1816).
19. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2366.
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Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc. 22 and Thompson v. INS,23
the Court declared that the "unique circumstances" doctrine was
illegitimate and beyond the power of the judiciary. 24 Recognizing
the possibility that the strict application of statutory time limits
may be inequitable, the majority noted that Congress is free to
authorize a method by which courts may sometimes excuse un-
timely filings. 25 Although the Court cautioned that such statutory
authorization may lead to frequent litigation over procedural
rules, the majority expressly held that federal courts have no au-
thority at present to create the exception sought in this case. 26
For these reasons, the Court affirmed the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 27
Writing in dissent, Justice Souter disagreed with the majority
on both the proper interpretation of statutory time limits and the
existence of judicial authority to create equitable exceptions to
those statutory time limits if and when they are jurisdictional re-
quirements. 28 Justice Souter began by listing many cases that
recognized the misuse of the word "jurisdiction."29 He opined that
the Court in the present case departed from the contemporary
practice of using recent decisions to consciously recognize its past
errors.30
The dissenters argued that treating a statutory deadline as a
mandatory but nonjurisdictional limit allows an opposing party or
an overburdened judge to claim its benefit while still permitting
reasonable discretion in waiving the requirement. 31  Justice
22. 371 U.S. 215 (1962) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360
(2007).
23. 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360
(2007).
24. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366.
25. Id. at 2367.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2367-69 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined by Justices Ste-
vens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 2367.
29. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting).
30. Id. The dissenting opinion read in part:
In recent years, however, we have tried to clean up our language, and until to-
day we have been avoiding the erroneous jurisdictional conclusions that flow
from indiscriminate use of the ambiguous word .... But one would never
guess this from reading the Court's opinion in this case, which suddenly re-
stores ... indiscriminate use of the [jurisdictional] label ....
Id. The dissenters also listed a series of past cases they believed were repudiated, in which
jurisdiction was found lacking due to the strict interpretation of mere time limits noted
within statutes as prerequisites to an exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
31. Id. at 2368.
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Souter objected to treating statutory time limits as jurisdictional
because waiver becomes impossible and the jurisdictional issue
must always be analyzed on the court's own initiative. 32 The dis-
sent further observed that statutes are only treated as jurisdic-
tional by interpreting courts when the statute expressly indicated
that its restrictions were jurisdictional in nature. 33 Acknowledg-
ing the lack of a jurisdictional designation in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c),
the dissenters concluded that the fourteen-day time limit for filing
an appeal after an order reopening the time period for filing has
been entered should not be interpreted as a jurisdictional re-
quirement. 
34
Assuming that his nonjurisdictional interpretation of statutory
deadlines was accepted, Justice Souter continued his dissent to
show the similarities between statutory time limits and statutes of
limitations. 35 Statutes of limitations are waivable by a party op-
ponent or excusable by judge-made rules or rulings because they
are merely affirmative defenses. 36 Citing the Harris and Thomp-
son cases overruled by the majority, the dissent wrote that those
decisions involved district court errors that could be equitably cor-
rected. 37 Further attacking the majority's presentation of prior
case law, Justice Souter noted that the Court's overruling of Har-
ris and Thompson repudiated the most recent line of cases that
sought to correct the jurisdictional misnomer previously applied to
statutory deadlines.
38
After asserting that the majority had improperly applied prece-
dent to the present case, Justice Souter wrote that the Court could
32. Id. Justice Souter recognized, however, that the statute itself may permit discre-
tion or a method for allowing a "meritorious excuse" to reinstate the court's jurisdiction. Id.
33. Id.
34. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2368 (Souter, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2369.
36. Id. Statutory time limits barring plaintiffs from seeking judgments on claims that
arose out of actions occurring prior to the specified periods "are practical and pragmatic
devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims." Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson,
325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). Statutes of limitations "represent a public policy about the privi-
lege to litigate," which is a "right of the individual" granted "by legislative grace." Id. The
United States Supreme Court has long held that "any citizen may no doubt waive the
rights to which he may be entitled." Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451
(1874). The Court distinguished these waivable individual rights from jurisdictional in-
quiries because "subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a
case, can never be forfeited or waived." United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
37. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2369 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2370. Further, Justice Souter criticized the majority's belief that the Court's
later cases retracted the Harris exception for "unique circumstances" because he felt the
majority relied on recent cases that have themselves been overruled. Id. at 2370 n.5.
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recognize an equitable exception to a statutory time limit. 39 With-
out expressly claiming a narrow constitutional right to exercise
jurisdiction where prohibited by Congress, the dissenters argued
that the judiciary could ignore the fourteen-day deadline even if
the time limit is, in fact, a jurisdictional requirement.4 0 First, the
dissenting opinion noted that Bowles' reliance on a federal judge's
order was clearly justified. 41 Next, Justice Souter analogized the
present case to Thompson, showing that a misfiled appeal may be
equitably corrected when the misfiling occurs due to reliance upon
a district court.42
Then, the dissenters noted that the order allowing Bowles to file
within seventeen days was not patently defective because the
statutory time period begins to run when the order is filed, not
when it is signed. 43 Justice Souter finally questioned whether the
Court should demand that lawyers verify the terms of every order
issued by a district judge to ensure compliance with the law. 44
The dissenting opinion concluded that reliance on a facially credi-
ble order from a federal judge is reasonable and therefore entitled
to equitable waiver. 45 Therefore, Justice Souter would have va-
cated the dismissal by the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case for
consideration of the merits. 46
Congress' power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court" necessarily includes the power to define the subject-matter
jurisdiction of those inferior courts. 47 In 1848, the United States
Supreme Court decided United States v. Curry & Garland,48
which was brought before them on an appeal from a district court
39. Id. at 2370.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2370-71 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2371. Positing a scenario where the order is signed on February 10 but not
filed until a later date, Justice Souter wrote:
[C]ounsel here could not have uncovered the court's error simply by counting
off the days on a calendar. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) allows a
party to file a notice of appeal within 14 days of "the date when [the district
court's] order to reopen is entered." See also 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c)(2) (allowing
reopening for "14 days from the date of entry").
Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2372.
46. Id.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 337-38
(1816).
48. 47 U.S. 106 (1848).
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that decided a real property ownership dispute. 49 At the time, the
federal statute that authorized the district court's jurisdiction over
these land disputes also provided an unconditional right to appeal
within one year of the district court's original decision. 50
Writing for a majority of eight justices, Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney declared that the district court's post-judgment proceedings
to determine the United States' power to appeal were undertaken
without proper jurisdiction and were therefore void. 51 Although
the Court recognized that the federal statute granting an uncondi-
tional right of appeal voided these post-judgment proceedings, the
majority noted that the erroneous hearings had led all parties to
allow the one-year time period in which to appeal to elapse. 52 De-
spite the peculiar circumstances, the Court held that the district
court's original decision would remain untouched, as a timely ap-
peal was required to allow the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion to attach under the relevant statute.
53
In 1960, the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Robin-
son 54 that Congress enacted a statute 55 allowing the Court to cre-
49. Curry, 47 U.S. at 110. The federal district court operated from Louisiana and mis-
takenly followed the procedures of Louisiana state courts when it held special hearings to
determine whether the United States was entitled to appeal its loss to landowners Thomas
Curry and Rice Garland. Id.
50. Id. at 112-13 (citing Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 95, 5 Stat. 676 (reviving Act of May
26, 1824, ch. 173, 4 Stat. 52)).
51. Id. Justice Woodbury was the lone dissenter. Id. at 113 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 112-13 (majority opinion).
53. Id. The crux of Chief Justice Taney's analysis read:
It has been said that this objection is a mere technicality, and may be regarded
rather as a matter of form than substance. But this court does not feel itself
authorized to treat the directions of an act of Congress as it might treat a tech-
nical difficulty growing out of ancient rules of the common law. The power to
hear and determine a case like this is conferred upon the court by acts of Con-
gress, and the same authority which gives the jurisdiction has pointed out the
manner in which the case shall be brought before us; and we have no power to
dispense with any of these provisions, nor to change or modify them. And if the
mode prescribed for removing cases by writ of error or appeal be too strict and
technical, and likely to produce inconvenience or injustice, it is for Congress to
provide a remedy by altering the existing laws; not for the court. And as this
appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited
by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Id. at 113.
54. 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
55. The Robinson Court cited "the Act of February 24, 1933, 47 Stat. 904 (now 18
U.S.C. § 3772)" as the statute that granted the United States Supreme Court its power to
create rules of procedure to govern the trial and appeal of criminal cases. Robinson, 361
U.S. at 226. This statute has been amended and moved several times, and the current
incarnation of this Congressional grant of rulemaking power is found under Title 28. 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-74 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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ate rules that would regulate the appeals process. 56 After the
Court produced the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, lower
circuit courts almost always interpreted any filing deadlines
within those rules as jurisdictional requirements that could not be
excused. 57 The Robinson Court extended the long-standing ra-
tionale for interpreting statutory deadlines for appeals as jurisdic-
tional requirements to the statutorily authorized but court-created
federal rules.
5 8
In Robinson, a jury convicted the defendants of manslaughter. 59
The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal,
which was filed eleven days after the deadline imposed by the
then-applicable Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. 60 The appel-
late court ruled that the district court could permit a late filing
despite an express provision within the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure that barred a district court from granting extra time for
an appeal. 61
Initially, the Supreme Court applied a plain meaning analysis
to the federal rules, treating them just like a federal statute.62
This analysis indicated that the appeal should be barred because
the rules expressly prohibited a district court from allowing an
appeal after ten days passed from the entry of judgment. 63 After
its "plain-meaning" analysis, the Court explored past cases in
which courts interpreted the rules as a set of deadlines that bound
the lower courts-rather than the parties-when processing ap-
peals. 64 Finally, the Court noted that the federal statutes author-
56. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 226. The Robinson Court noted that "Congress first gave this
Court authority to promulgate rules regulating the time and manner for taking appeals in
criminal cases" in 1933. Id. at 226. The Court noted that the authorizing statute as
amended allowed the Court "to prescribe Rules of Criminal Procedure to and including
verdict, which would become effective upon passive acceptance by Congress." Id. at 227.
57. Id. at 224 n.4, 227 n.8.
58. Id. at 229.
59. Id. at 220.
60. Id. at 221 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a)(2) (1960) (repealed 1967)). The appellate
court noted that the district court found that the non-filing was caused by excusable neglect
when defendant Travit Robinson and his lawyer had a miscommunication over who would
actually file the necessary notice of appeal. Id. at 221 n.1.
61. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 223-24. All other appellate courts that had interpreted the
same language held that the rules had the same effect as a statutory limitation on jurisdic-
tion, leading to the grant of certiorari. Id. at 224.
62. Id. at 224. The "plain-meaning rule" is "[tihe rule that if a writing, or a provision in
a writing, appears to be unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the
writing itself without resort to any extrinsic evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (8th
ed. 2004).
63. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 224-25.
64. Id. at 225-26.
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izing the creation of the federal rules also gave them statutory
effect.65 This final analysis led to the Court's holding that any
injustices within the rules should be addressed through the rule-
making process rather than court decisions, effectively changing
procedural deadlines within the rules into jurisdictional require-
ments. 66
Two years after Robinson was decided, in Harris Truck Lines,
Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc.,67 the Court heard a case involv-
ing a trucking company that had sued to recover shipping charges
from an industrial customer. 68 In Harris, the trucking company's
general counsel was in Mexico and unreachable by trial counsel
when a verdict was rendered against it.69 The trial lawyer re-
quested that the district court extend the thirty-day deadline to
file notice of appeal, provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, so that he could consult the vacationing general counsel. 70
Although the district court granted the request, the appellate
court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the district court
lacked the authority to extend the deadline under the circum-
stances. 71
65. Id. at 226-27.
66. Id. at 229-30. The Robinson Court referred to the original drafts and prior versions
of the rules to discern their present meanings from the drafters' intent, much like Congress'
intent is analyzed when trying to determine if a statute was intended as a jurisdictional
limitation. Id. at 228-29. In addressing a court's ability to make equitable exceptions to
the so-called jurisdictional requirements of the rules, the Court wrote:
That powerful policy arguments may be made both for and against greater
flexibility with respect to the time for the taking of an appeal is indeed evident.
But that policy question, involving, as it does, many weighty and conflicting
considerations, must be resolved through the rule-making process and not by
judicial decision. If, by that process, the courts are ever given power to extend
the time for filing of a notice of appeal upon a finding of excusable neglect, it
seems reasonable to think that some definite limitation upon the time within
which they might do so would be prescribed .... Whatever may be the proper
resolution of the policy question involved, it was beyond the power of the Court
of Appeals to resolve it.
Id. at 228-29 (citation omitted).
67. 371 U.S. 215 (1962), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
68. Harris, 371 U.S. at 215.
69. Id. at 216.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court of appeals held that
a showing of "excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the en-
try of the judgment," Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 73(a), had not been made out to the
motion judge, that there was hence no basis for waiving the thirty-day limit,




Granting certiorari and vacating the judgment in the same writ-
ing, the Supreme Court first recognized that motions for time ex-
tensions could be made before or after the thirty-day deadline
passed, with any motions coming before the lapse being required
to show that excusable neglect would lead to a party's failure to
learn of the judgment. 72 Then, the Court recognized that the trial
court's finding of excusable neglect should be unreviewable on ap-
peal due to the hardship suffered by a party who relies on such a
finding. 73 Without deciding whether the general counsel's absence
constituted "excusable neglect," the Court remanded the case for a
decision on the merits in light of the unique circumstances faced
by the trucking company in obtaining appellate jurisdiction. 74
The "unique circumstances" exception from the Harris case was
applied by a slim majority in the subsequent case of Thompson v.
INS.75 When Thompson's petition for naturalization was rejected,
he filed a motion for a new trial twelve days later.76 Although the
relevant federal rule only allowed ten days for Thompson to make
such a motion, both the Government and the trial judge ignored
this error.77 When the motion for a new trial was denied on the
merits, Thompson appealed. 78 The appellate court dismissed the
appeal for want of jurisdiction because the untimely filing of the
new trial motion did not toll the sixty-day deadline in which
Thompson was required to file notice of appeal.7 9
The majority of the Supreme Court found that Thompson's reli-
ance on the district court's statement that the new trial motion
was timely mirrored Harris Truck Lines, Inc.'s reliance on the dis-
trict court's finding of excusable neglect.80 Thus, the "unique cir-
72. Id. at 215-17.
73. Harris, 371 U.S. at 217.
74. Id.
75. 375 U.S. 384 (1964), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). The
five-justice majority issued a per curiam opinion. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 384. Justice
Clark authored a dissent, which was joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White. Id. at
387 (Clark, J., dissenting).
76. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 384-85 (majority opinion).
77. Id. at 385.
78. Id.
79. Id. At the time, the relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure required that notice of
appeal be filed within sixty days of the entry of the judgment unless a motion for, inter alia,
a new trial was "timely" made. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a) (1962) (repealed 1968)). If
such a timely motion were made, the deadline for filing notice of appeal would essentially
be tolled because it would only begin to run once the district court ruled upon that motion.
Id.
80. Id. at 386-87.
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cumstances" exception allowed the appellate court to accept juris-
diction and hear the merits of the appeal.
81
Justice Clark's dissent, however, differentiated between the le-
gally incorrect finding of excusable neglect on a timely motion in
the Harris case and the Thompson district court's void denial of a
new trial on an untimely motion.8 2 Noting that only a timely mo-
tion could toll the mandatory filing deadline in this case, the dis-
senters argued that reliance upon a district court's error in enter-
taining an improper motion could not be excused.8 3 The dissent-
ers contrasted Thompson's situation with an example of justifiable
reliance, noting that the Harris district court's incorrect-but le-
gally valid-finding of a circumstance allowing an extension of the
filing deadline was inherently discretionary.8 4 Emphasizing the
need for uniform application of the federal rules, Justice Clark
wrote that he would have affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding
that jurisdiction was lacking. 85
In Browder v. Department of Corrections,8 6 the Court considered
whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be strictly ap-
plied in a case where an otherwise relevant statute was silent as
to whether a procedural deadline was required in a specific type of
proceeding.87 Noting that a habeas corpus proceeding is both a
civil proceeding and a type of litigation that is expressly addressed
by federal statutes, the Browder Court ruled that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure simply fill any procedural gaps left by the
statutes and the historical practices employed in habeas proceed-
ings.88 After issuing this ruling, the Court addressed whether the
Department's appeal was timely and therefore within the jurisdic-
tion of the appellate court.89
The district court granted Browder a new trial because im-
proper evidence was introduced in his Illinois rape trial, and the
Department untimely moved for reconsideration. 90 In a scenario
81. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387.
82. Id. at 389 (Clark, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 388-89.
84. Id. at 389.
85. Id. at 390.
86. 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
87. Browder, 434 U.S. at 268-69.
88. Id. at 269. The Court utilized the Rules' own instructions for handling this situa-
tion, noting that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas proceedings only 'to
the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United
States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions." Id. (citing FED. R.
CIv. P. 81(a)(2) (1974) (amended 2002)).
89. Id. at 270-71.
90. Id. at 259-61.
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procedurally resembling Thompson, the district court improperly
held a hearing to reconsider its prior ruling, which led to the lapse
of the thirty-day deadline in which the Department had to file an
appeal because the rules did not allow this improper hearing to
toll the time period. 91 The Supreme Court was compelled to bar
the Department's appeal for want of jurisdiction because the
Court had found that the rules had statutory authority so long as
there was not an actual federal statute to the contrary.92 Al-
though the Court cited both Harris and Thompson, it did not at-
tempt to explain why Browder was not entitled to a "unique cir-
cumstances" exception.
93
In 2004, a unanimous Court addressed several key issues re-
garding the application of federal rules and jurisdictional designa-
tions of time limits within those rules. 94 Kontrick v. Ryan95 arose
after Dr. Ryan objected to prevent his former associate, Dr. Kon-
trick, from successfully declaring bankruptcy. 96 Under the appli-
cable Bankruptcy Rule, Ryan was required to file a civil complaint
providing the grounds for his objection within sixty days, but he
failed to do so.97 Once Ryan filed his untimely complaint, Kon-
trick answered, addressing only the merits. 98 After the bank-
ruptcy court ruled in favor of Ryan, Kontrick was deemed ineligi-
ble for bankruptcy protection. 99 Kontrick then appealed the bank-
ruptcy court's judgment, claiming that it was void due to a lack of
jurisdiction arising out of Ryan's late filing. 100 Every court that
reviewed the appeal found for Ryan. 101
91. Id. at 260-62.
92. Browder, 434 U.S. at 270-72.
93. Id. at 269-70. Harris was cited to show that a certain discovery procedure usually
available in civil cases was not applicable in habeas proceedings because another rule spe-
cifically provided for a different procedure. Id. at 269-70. Thompson was cited to demon-
strate that the Thompson Court had assumed that the same federal rules at issue in
Browder were applicable to a citizenship proceeding, allowing the Browder Court to con-
clude that those rules were also applicable to a habeas proceeding because citizenship hear-
ings and habeas proceedings were meant to utilize substantially the same procedures un-
der yet another rule. Id. at 270.
94. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004). Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion.
Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 446.
95. 540 U.S. 443 (2004).
96. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 448-49. Ryan was also a creditor of Kontrick, and Ryan ob-
jected to Kontrick's bankruptcy petition on the ground that Kontrick had fraudulently
transferred assets to his wife to evade attachment. Id.
97. Id. at 447-49 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a)).
98. Id. at 449.
99. Id. at 450-51.
100. Id. at 451.
101. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 451-52.
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The Supreme Court observed unrelated deadlines within the
Bankruptcy Code but also noted that the Code conferred jurisdic-
tion to hear complaints against a bankruptcy petitioner upon fed-
eral bankruptcy courts without mentioning any time limita-
tions. 0 2 The Court held that the time limits for filing such a com-
plaint could never be "jurisdictional" in nature because those
deadlines only appear in the Bankruptcy Rules.10 3 The Kontrick
Court thus differentiated between rules-based "claims-processing
rules" and statutory jurisdictional deadlines. 1
04
However, Dr. Kontrick argued that he merely misused the word
"jurisdictional" when identifying the ground for his appeal because
the rules should nonetheless be interpreted as mandatory and in-
excusable deadlines. 10 5 The Court believed that Kontrick disre-
garded the fundamental difference between a requirement for sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction and a mandatory claim-processing rule. 10 6
Justice Ginsburg explained the difference, stating that subject-
matter jurisdiction can never be expanded during litigation, but
the affirmative defense provided by an unalterable claims-
processing rule could be forfeited or waived. 10 7 The Kontrick
Court thus held that Kontrick forfeited his affirmative defense to
Ryan's untimely filing when Kontrick proceeded to answer Ryan's
complaint on its merits. 10
8
In dicta, the Kontrick Court observed that much of Kontrick's
rhetoric addressed whether the mandatory deadlines within fed-
eral rules could be equitably tolled or excused. 0 9 The Court did
not rule on this issue because Ryan never claimed an equitable
exception in order to advance his untimely filing. 110 Kontrick's
appeal was decided on the issue of whether he could amend his
answer at such a late date to take advantage of the time bar pro-
102. Id. at 453.
103. Id. at 453-54. Although the Court recognized that the rules were created in re-
sponse to a federal statute, it wrote that '"[it is axiomatic' that such rules 'do not create or
withdraw federal jurisdiction."' Id. at 453 (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978)).
104. Id. at 453-55.
105. Id. at 454-55.
106. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 458-60.
109. Id. at 457-58.
110. Id. at 457. Because Ryan never advanced a request for equitable relief, "[w]hether
the Rules, despite their strict limitations, could be softened on equitable grounds is there-
fore a question [the Court did] not reach." Id.
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vided by the Bankruptcy Rules in the event of an untimely credi-
tor filing.11' The Court answered this question in the negative.11
2
Ultimately, Congress may limit the subject-matter jurisdiction
of any federal court." 3 Long ago, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that one such jurisdictional limitation could be a
statutory filing deadline. 114 Confusion arose after Congress dele-
gated its power to create procedural rules for federal courts to the
Supreme Court.1 5 Initially, the Court designated its rules as ju-
risdictional requirements because Congress tacitly accepted those
rules. 116 When such an interpretation led to unjust results, the
Court developed an equitable "unique circumstances" exception."1
7
The early decisions treated the rules as jurisdictional but excus-
able time limits.' 18 Then, in Browder, the Court altered its per-
ception of the federal rules by holding that (1) the rules could be
preempted by passing a relevant procedural statute, (2) the rules
would otherwise serve to fill all procedural gaps, and (3) the rules
indeed had statutory authority when applied. 1 9 Despite many
similarities to the past "equitable exception" cases, Browder never
discussed any possible ways to excuse the filing deadlines found
within the rules.
20
111. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 458-59.
112. Id. at 460. The Court noted that Kontrick did not raise his rules-based affirmative
defense of a time bar until after the bankruptcy court's decision on the merits of the case.
Id. at 459-60. Kontrick's affirmative defense was forfeited because "[o]nly lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction is preserved post-trial" and Kontrick's "claim [was] not of that order."
Id.
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 337-38
(1816); Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1987); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
114. United States v. Curry & Garland, 47 U.S. 106 (1848). Specifically speaking, Con-
gress may intentionally limit a court's subject-matter jurisdiction by imposing a statutory
time limit upon the appealing party within which that party must file to allow an exercise
of that court's appellate jurisdiction. Curry, 47 U.S. at 112-13.
115. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1960). This confusion arose be-
cause the federal rules created by the Court were not only procedural guidelines but also
possibly jurisdictional requirements since Congress passively accepted those rules as its
own by statute. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 227.
116. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 227.
117. Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 385-87 (1964). The Harris case is the oft-cited
example of this proposition, despite the fact that the case could have been resolved on other
grounds. Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217 (1962).
118. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387. See also Harris, 371 U.S. at 217.
119. Browder v. Dep't of Corrs., 434 U.S. 257, 270-72 (1978). Congress passed a statute
specifically outlining the procedural guidelines that should be followed in habeas corpus
proceedings, but that statute was silent on a point that was directly addressed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Browder, 434 U.S. at 269-70.
120. Id.
Bowles v. Russell
A recent line of cases has designated federal rules as nonjuris-
dictional "claims-processing rules" that could-at best-provide
affirmative defenses. 121 While Bowles accepted that federal rules
cannot create jurisdictional requirements, the Bowles majority
believed that all federal procedural statutes passed by Congress
must be strictly construed as jurisdictional requirements. 122 Ac-
cordingly, the law now requires that all deadlines enumerated
within federal statutes be strictly constructed as jurisdictional
prerequisites that may never be equitably excused. 123 Further-
more, the federal rules merely provide affirmative defenses that
may be waived, forfeited, or equitably excused as long as the rule
does not embody an underlying federal statute imposing the same
time limit. 1
24
The Bowles opinion provided needed clarification on how the
federal courts should interpret procedural rules and statutes. Re-
gardless of whether one advocates a strict or loose construction of
federal law, the Supreme Court wisely exhibited and maintained a
consistent theory of strict construction. 125 After such a method
has been repeatedly and routinely applied, Congress will know
how it must write statutes to obtain the desired legal conse-
quences. The conservative Bowles majority demonstrated a phi-
losophy of strict constructionism.126 Lower federal courts should
follow this judicial philosophy, so that Congress will have a clear
backdrop upon which to legislate procedural issues.
Bowles also created two bright-line rules. 127 First, procedural
deadlines are now jurisdictional requirements unless otherwise
noted within the statutes that created those time limits. 128 Sec-
ond, the federal rules merely establish affirmative defenses unless
the rules are the embodiment of an underlying statute. 129 These
121. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 453-54.
122. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366.
123. Id. at 2364.
124. Id.
125. Strict constructionism is "the doctrinal view of judicial construction holding that
judges should interpret a ... statute ... according to its literal terms, without looking to
other sources to ascertain the meaning." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1462 (8th ed. 2004).
Loose construction-also known as liberal construction-is "an interpretation that applies
a writing in light of the situation presented and that tends to effectuate the spirit and pur-
pose of the writing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 962, 332 (8th ed. 2004).
126. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367.
127. A bright-line rule is "a legal rule of decision that tends to resolve issues, especially
ambiguities, simply and straightforwardly, sometimes sacrificing equity for certainty."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 205 (8th ed. 2004).
128. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365.
129. Id. at 2364. See also Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 453-54.
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clear interpretive guidelines actually overruled Robinson, Harris,
Thompson, and Browder, despite the Bowles dissenters' contrary
belief.130 Furthermore, as the Bowles majority indicated, Con-
gress may designate specific, nonjurisdictional statutory deadlines
or grant federal courts the power to excuse untimely filings.
131
Pursuing uniformity, bright-line rules are more desirable, even
though such rules "sometimes sacrific[e] equity for certainty." 132
None of the Bowles Court members denied that Congress could
limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by
setting mandatory filing deadlines. 133 Furthermore, the entire
Bowles Court agreed that the federal rules could not be given
statutory or jurisdictional effect, thus answering an old ques-
tion. 34 Ultimately, the key issue was how federal statutes gov-
erning procedure should be interpreted. While Congress should
resolve the matter sooner rather than later, the Bowles majority
arrived at the correct conclusion.
Nonetheless, the majority's conclusion was abruptly delivered
after merely indicating that Congress had such power to limit ju-
risdiction; the Court's analysis should have addressed why a pro-
cedural statute reflects the use of that power. 35 Knowing that the
Supreme Court created numerous and detailed rules to govern
civil procedure, Congress intervened nevertheless.
130. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2370 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2367 (majority opinion).
132. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (8th ed. 2004).
133. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. 2360.
134. Id. A key criticism of the prior procedural cases on point read:
[The late] Professor [James William] Moore points out (9 Moore's Federal Prac-
tice (2d ed) 1204.02 [2]) that so many hundreds of cases support the proposition
that a Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal that it is
too late to undermine the proposition by mere history and logic. He notes,
however, that the idea that the time for appeal is jurisdictional took hold at a
time when the time for review was fixed by statute, and that it was jurisdic-
tional when it was embedded in statutes creating jurisdiction. But when Con-
gress turned over to the Supreme Court the power to prescribe procedural
rules, he continues, it in effect announced that it no longer intended to define
jurisdiction in time, and it can hardly be supposed to have turned over to the
Supreme Court the power to define the jurisdiction of federal courts. His con-
clusion is that it is too plain for argument that the time for appeal is no longer
jurisdictional.
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Appellate review of order denying extension of time for filing
notice of appeal under Rule 4(a) of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 39 A.L.R. Fed. 829
(1978).
135. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366. As noted earlier, the dissenters did not disagree with
Justice Thomas' opinion that such power existed but rather why the mere existence of a
procedural statute should be interpreted as an exercise of that limiting power-particularly
when Congress did not expressly designate the statute as "jurisdictional." Id. at 2368
(Souter, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, Congress has the power to create affirmative defenses,
such as statutes of limitations. 136 However, such statutes are di-
rected towards the parties and create personal rights.137 Where
statutes appear in a separate procedural title and address the fed-
eral courts'power, the reasonable inference must be that Congress
wished to create a judicial restriction.138 The Bowles majority
should have included this observation to address the real split on
the issue. Ironically, the liberal construction of the limiting stat-
ute would lead to this extensive analysis of why Congress chose
the words it did when crafting the statute-and this analysis leads
to the conclusion that Congress wanted its words to be strictly
construed and enforced as a limitation on the court's power.
The Bowles dissenters claimed that statutory procedural dead-
lines should only be construed as jurisdictional barriers when
Congress expressly designated the statutes as jurisdictional pre-
requisites. 139 Disadvantages to this approach include (1) forcing
Congress to designate the degree to which each of its statutes
should be enforced, 140 (2) blurring the bright-line rule requiring
strict compliance with procedures outlined in statutes,' 4 ' (3) un-
dercutting the policy determinations that Congress made when
enacting its procedural statutes,142 and (4) ignoring the specific
statutory remedies within those procedures that already give fed-
eral courts discretion to correct inequities caused by a strict appli-
136. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1945).
137. Chase, 325 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added). Statutes of limitations often address the
plaintiff, as "most statutes provide either that 'all actions ... shall be brought within' or 'no
action . . . shall be brought more than' so many years after 'the cause thereof accrued."'
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1950)
(emphasis added). Clearly, only a plaintiff can bring an action, so such words do not ad-
dress the court. Furthermore, the defendant is solely responsible for alerting the court
when a plaintiff has forfeited the plaintiffs right to adjudication by waiting too long. Day
v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205-06 (2006). Just as the plaintiff may lose his or her right
to a remedy by filing an untimely complaint, a defendant may lose the right of automatic
dismissal created by the statutory affirmative defense if the defendant fails to raise the
issue. Day, 547 U.S. at 205. Accord Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 458-59.
138. The statute at issue in Bowles directly addressed the power of the court, as it read,
"[T]he district court... may reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days." 28 U.S.C. §
2107(c) (2000) (emphasis added). Furthermore, this statute appears under Title 28, which
addresses the "Judiciary and Judicial Procedure." Id. (emphasis added).
139. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2368 (Souter, J., dissenting).
140. Unlike a simple jurisdictional deadline that can never be evaded, a statutorily im-
posed time limit of a nonjurisdictional nature may be waived, forfeited, or equitably ex-
cused for a myriad of different reasons. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456. Absent Congress' ex-
plicit detailing of when every statutory deadline must really be met versus when the time
limit is expendable, the federal courts would have free rein to simply proceed as if Con-
gress' procedural statutes were no more binding than the federal rules. See generally id.
141. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365 (majority opinion).
142. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960).
262 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 46
cation of, inter alia, filing deadlines. 143 For the same reasons, any
effort "to recognize an equitable exception" to procedural deadlines
would be "illegitimate."'
144
The Bowles majority recognized the final criticism of a strict ap-
proach to procedural deadlines. 145 Noting that statutory time lim-
its could lead to injustice when applied as jurisdictional prerequi-
sites, Justice Thomas reasoned that Congress may rewrite these
time limitations as it sees fit. 146 While the majority urged Con-
gress to keep the statutes more effective by barring exercises of
discretion, the Bowles opinion failed to note that Congress could
rectify any grave injustice by passing a specific grant of jurisdic-
tion. In addition to the benefits of clarity,147 the possibility of a
specific Congressional remedy for the rare troublesome case ren-
ders the broad criticism of unfairness in strict interpretation
moot. 14
8
Bowles v. Russell tested the extent of federal court power to es-
tablish its own procedures. Bowles reaffirmed the long-standing
notion that the federal rules could not create or destroy federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. 149 Despite the criticism that the Su-
preme Court did not properly use its rule-making power to trump
older statutes, the Bowles Court correctly refused to usurp the
143. 3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72:3 (6th ed.
2004). "Courts must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making
every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner which would render other provisions of
the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous." Id. As the Bowles majority
noted, "Congress specifically limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend
the notice-of-appeal period in [28 U.S.C.] § 2107(c)." Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366. Further-
more, that statute only allowed the district court to grant a time extension for "excusable
neglect or good cause." 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). By "recogniz[ing] an equitable exception to the
14-day limit" of § 2107(c), the Bowles dissenters would have rendered the district court's
express power to decide what constitutes "excusable neglect or good cause" "meaningless or
superfluous." Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2370 (Souter, J., dissenting); see SINGER, supra, § 72:3.
This interpretation would have also extended the district court's power by allowing the
lower court to grant an indeterminate amount of time to a party who demonstrated such a
need, thereby making § 2107(c)'s fourteen-day limit "inconsistent" with the stated Congres-
sional intent of only permitting a court to extend the filing period for fourteen days. 28
U.S.C. § 2107(c); SINGER, supra, § 72:3.
144. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2370 (Souter, J., dissenting), 2366 (majority opinion).
145. Id. at 2367 (majority opinion).
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Congress has been known to enact very specific statutes in high-profile cases to
expressly grant a single aggrieved party the right to appear in federal court, such as when
the life-support debate over Theresa (Terri) Schiavo could only enter federal court via such
specific approval. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
149. The prevailing case law noted that '"[i]t is axiomatic' that such rules 'do not create
or withdraw federal jurisdiction."' Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 453 (quoting Owen Equip. & Erec-
tion Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978)).
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legislative function belonging to Congress. 150 Instead, the Su-
preme Court provided a clear message: Until Congress says oth-
erwise, meet the deadlines provided by federal statutes that grant
courts the power to hear your case. 151
Joseph A. Valenti
150. Luther Munford, Appellate Guessing Game, 30 NAT'L L.J. 23 (2007) ("[N]one of the
justices seemed to understand that they promulgate the rules and, absent congressional
disapproval, the rules that they promulgate trump prior statutes.").
151. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365-66.
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